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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early part of the twentieth century, when the Supreme
Court of the United States decided Hale v. Henkel' and Wilson v.
United States,2 custodians of corporate records have been unable to
invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination when
asked to produce corporate documents pursuant to a subpoena. The
doctrine that the Supreme Court formulated in Hale and Wilson,
which has become known as the "corporate entity exception," seemed
an unassailable benchmark of fifth amendment jurisprudence until the
1. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
2. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
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Court's decision in United States v. Doe. 3
In Doe, the Supreme Court held that the contents of a sole pro-
prietor's business records were not privileged under the fifth amend-
ment.4 The Court also held that a sole proprietor could assert the
fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination if the
act of producing business records pursuant to a subpoena was both
testimonial and incriminating in effect.5 The Doe Court, by applying
the "act of production" doctrine which it had enunciated in Fisher v.
United States,6 changed the focus of fifth amendment analysis for the
production of documents and left unanswered whether the "act of
production" doctrine would affect the "corporate entity exception" by
extending fifth amendment protection to custodians of corporate
records.'
Recently, three courts of appeals, in In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings (Morganstern),8 In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum,9
and In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown),"° have addressed the issue left
open in Doe. " Although the cases differ in rationale and result, they
share a common theme 12 that may provide a framework for resolving
the fifth amendment issues that are presented when custodians of cor-
porate records are asked to produce business documents. This Com-
ment proposes a rule 13 that would extend Doe's protection to
custodians of corporate records and still allow investigative bodies to
gain access to corporate business records by subpoena or summons.' 4
Part II examines the fifth amendment's application to the production
of documents and the development of the "corporate entity" and
3. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
4. Id. at 612.
5. Id. at 612-14.
6. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The Supreme Court explained that "compliance with the
subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control
by the [defendant]. It also would indicate the [defendant's] belief that the papers are those
described in the subpoena." Id. at 410 (citing Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125
(1957)).
7. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
8. 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, Morganstern v. United States, 106 S.
Ct. 594 (1985).
9. 769 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1985).
10. 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc).
11. See infra notes 85-135 and accompanying text (analyzing Brown, Two Grand Jury
Subpoenae, and Morganstern).
12. See infra notes 194-214 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
14. The privilege against self-incrimination does not bar the seizure of personal or business
documents pursuant to a valid search warrant. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 477
(1976). Although the seizure of documents creates some fourth amendment problems, these
are beyond the scope of this comment.
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"collective entity"" exceptions to the fifth amendment. Part III
examines Fisher and Doe and analyzes the "act of production" doc-
trine. Part IV analyzes Morganstern, Two Grand Jury Subpoenae, and
Brown, and examines the differences among the three cases. Part V
discusses whether the "act of production" doctrine, as the Supreme
Court applied it in Fisher and Doe, extends to custodians of corporate
records. Parts VI and VII extract a common theme from the three
cases and develop a framework for dealing with the fifth amendment
rights of corporate custodians. This Comment concludes that
although corporations should not be able to shield their records, the
rationale underlying the "act of production" doctrine makes that doc-
trine applicable to the custodians of corporate records.
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS
A. Boyd v. United States and Early Corporate Entity Cases
Boyd v. United States16 marked the first application of the
fourth' 7 and fifth"8 amendments to court orders or subpoenas 9
requiring production of documents and papers. Boyd involved a cus-
toms forfeiture proceeding in which the government sought to utilize
an 1874 statutory provision to gain documentary evidence from the
importer of property to be forfeited. The provision authorized the
trial judge, on a motion of the government describing a particular
document and indicating what it might prove, to issue a notice
directing the importer to produce the document.2" The trial court in
15. The Supreme Court formulated the "collective entity" concept, an extension of the
"corporate entity exception," in United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), and Bellis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
16. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
17. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. The fifth amendment provides that "no person.., shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For an exhaustive history of the
fifth amendment, see L. LEVY, THE ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968).
19. "A subpoena is a command to appear at a certain time and place to give testimony
upon a certain matter. A subpoena duces tecum requires production of books, papers" and
other documents. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979). See also Fed. R. Civ. P.
45(a)-(b) (A subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to give testimony or
produce documents.).
20. 116 U.S. at 618-20.
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Boyd directed the defendant to produce an invoice for twenty-nine
cases of glass plates that the defendant allegedly had imported with-
out payment of customs duties.21 Pursuant to this directive, the
defendant produced the invoice, and, as a result, the trial court
entered a judgment of forfeiture.22 On appeal the Supreme Court held
that the compulsory production of the defendant's private papers vio-
lated the fourth 23 and fifth 24 amendments. The Court reasoned that
there was an intimate relation between the two amendments and
stated that courts should liberally construe constitutional provisions
that ensure the security of persons and property.25 Although Justice
Miller and Chief Justice Waite did not believe that the fourth amend-
ment applied to the case before the Court, 26 every member of the
Court agreed that compulsory production of private 27 papers violated
the fifth amendment.
Twenty years later, in Hale v. Henkel,2s a corporate officer, to
whom the government had granted immunity from prosecution,
refused to testify or comply with a subpoena duces tecum. The Court
dismissed the officer's fifth amendment claim because the grant of
21. Id. at 619.
22. Id. at 618.
23. Justice Bradley, writing for the Court, stated that "a compulsory production of the
private books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited" was "the equivalent of a
search and seizure . . . within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 634-35. One
commentator has noted that "much of Boyd's Fourth Amendment analysis has been relegated
to the judicial graveyard, and it is at least arguable that its Fifth Amendment analysis is
headed in the same direction." W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.12
(1985).
24. 116 U.S. at 634-35. Some commentators believe that the death-knell has been sounded
for Boyd's "private papers" doctrine. See, e.g., Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd- Self-
Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1979) (Burger
Court has removed Boyd's right of privacy "gloss" from the fifth amendment); Note,
Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1977) (Supreme Court has supplanted Boyd's absolute
fourth and fifth amendment safeguards for certain papers based on the private nature of their
contents with a more relativistic reading of the protections provided by these amendments).
But see infra note 84 (Most lower courts have held that the fifth amendment still protects in
some way the contents of "private papers.").
25. 116 U.S. at 634.
26. "Nothing in the nature of a search is here hinted at. Nor is there any seizure, because
the party is not required at any time to part with the custody of the papers." Id. at 640 (Miller,
J., concurring).
27. The Supreme Court used the term "private" even though the invoice in question was
"'from the Union Plate Glass Company.' " Id. at 619. The Court followed English common
law, which protected "private" writings but "did not recognize a dichotomy between personal
and business documents in defining 'private.'" Note, Business Records and the Fifth
Amendment Right against Self-Incrimination, 38 OHIO ST. L. J. 351, 352 (1977).
28. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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immunity included the act of producing corporate records.29 The
Court also held that the officer could not claim the privilege against
self-incrimination on behalf of the corporation in order to refuse pro-
duction of documents, because the corporation did not have any fifth
amendment rights; the Court viewed this privilege as purely
personal.3 °
The Supreme Court extended Hale in Wilson v. United States;3'
the Court held that an officer of a corporation could not claim his
privilege against self-incrimination in order to refuse production of
corporate records sought pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum
directed to the corporation. 32  Because the records belonged to the
29. Id. at 73.
30. The Court stated:
[We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular [sic]
between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse
to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the State. The
individual may stand upon his constitutional right as a citizen. He is entitled to
carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited.
He owes no such duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or
to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He
owes no duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the
protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the
land long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be taken from
him by due process of law.... Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature
of the State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It
receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the
laws of the State and the limitations of its charter. . . . Its rights to act as a
corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation.
There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out
whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a
State, having chartered a corporation to make use of its franchises, could not in
the exercise of its sovereignty inquire how these franchises had been employed,
and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of corporate
books and papers for that purpose.
Id. at 74-75. The first formulation of the "corporate entity" exception seemed to be based on
the government's need to regulate corporations which it had chartered. Id.
31. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
32. In explaining its decision, the Court stated:
The appellant held the corporate books subject to the corporate duty. If the
corporation were guilty of misconduct, he could not withhold its books to save it;
and if he were implicated in the violations of law, he could not withhold the
books to protect himself from the effect of their disclosures. The reserved power
of visitation would seriously be embarrassed, if not wholly defeated in its effective
exercise, if guilty officers could refuse inspection of the records and papers of the
corporation. No personal privilege to which they are entitled requires such a
conclusion.., the visitorial power which exists with respect to the corporation of
necessity reaches the corporate books, without regard to the conduct of the
custodian.
Id. at 384-85. In a companion case, Drier v. United States, the Court held that corporate
documents had to be produced even though the subpoena in question was directed at the
secretary of the corporation. 221 U.S. 394 (1911).
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corporation, "there [was] no ground upon which it [could] be said
that [the officer]" could withhold the records, even if he had prepared
them himself.3 3 The Court reasoned that if the records belonged to
the corporation the officer could not withhold them from the govern-
ment; the Court made short shrift of the fact that the officer had been
indicted by the grand jury that sought the corporate records.I In his
dissent, Justice McKenna argued that the fifth amendment privilege
was "a personal liberty" and that "a distinction based on the owner-
ship of the books demanded as evidence [was] immaterial." 3"
In Grant v. United States,36 the Court held that an attorney could
not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination to justify his refusal
to obey a subpoena directing him to produce the records of a "one-
man" corporation that had ceased to do business. The Court reasoned
that the documents in Grant's possession were independent docu-
ments and that it would not regard them as privileged even if Grant
had received them for purposes of consultation.37 In dicta, the Court
stated that the sole stockholder could not withhold the records on the
ground that they would tend to incriminate him.38
After Grant, it was clear that neither corporations nor their cus-
todians could refuse to produce corporate records. Although the
early "corporate entity" cases paid lip service to Boyd, it was apparent
that they had begun to foreshadow Boyd's decline.
B. The Emergence of the "Collective Entity" Exception
In United States v. White,39 the Supreme Court of the United
States extended Hale to unincorporated organizations and formulated
33. 221 U.S. at 378.
34. Id. at 379.
35. Id. at 388 (McKenna, J., dissenting). Justice McKenna may have been right in finding
the ownership of the records immaterial. In Wheeler v. United States, the Court held that
Wilson was controlling even though the corporation whose records were sought had been
dissolved. 226 U.S. 478 (1913).
36. 227 U.S. 74 (1913).
37. Id. at 79.
38. The Court explained:
The books and papers called for by the subpoena were corporate records and
documents. Whether or not the title to them had passed to Burlingame when the
Ensworth Company ceased to do business, their essential character was not
changed. They remained subject to inspection and examination when required by
competent authority, and they could not have been withheld by Burlingame
himself upon the ground that they would tend to incriminate him.
Id. at 79-80. For later cases holding that the sole stockholder in a "one-man" corporation
cannot refuse to produce records, see Reamer v. Beall, 506 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1965).
39. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
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the "collective entity" doctrine. In White, a federal district court
issued a subpoena to an unincorporated labor union. The subpoena
required the union to produce copies of "its constitution and by-laws
and specifically enumerated union records showing its collections of
work-permit fees" before a grand jury investigating "alleged irregular-
ities in the construction" of a naval depot.' The union officer that
had the records in his possession refused to produce them, and, as a
result, the district court held him in contempt. The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed. The court held that the union officer
could refuse to produce the records if they tended to incriminate him
because the records of the union belonged to all of its members.4'
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals and held that the officer could not refuse to produce the
records even if they incriminated him.42 Justice Murphy, writing for a
unanimous court,4 3 stated:
Since the privilege against self-incrimination is a purely per-
sonal one, it cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization,
such as a corporation. Moreover, the papers and effects which the
privilege protects must be the private property of the person claim-
ing the privilege, or at least in his possession in a purely personal
capacity. But individuals, when acting as representatives of a col-
lective group, cannot be said to be exercising their personal rights
and duties nor to be entitled to their purely personal privileges.
Rather they assume the rights, duties and privileges of the artificial
entity or association of which they are agents or officers and they
are bound by its obligations. In their official capacity, therefore,
they have no privilege against self-incrimination.'
Justice Murphy also stated that the union's lack of incorporation
did not "lessen the public necessity for making reasonable regulations
of its activities effective, nor does it confer upon such an organization
the purely personal privilege against self-incrimination."45 Whether
or not an organization could invoke the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation depended on:
[w]hether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a par-
ticular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the
scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to
embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its
40. Id. at 695.
41. 137 F.2d 24 (3d Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
42. 322 U.S. at 704.
43. Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson concurred in the result, but did not write
opinions. Id. at 705.
44. Id. at 699 (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 700-01.
1986]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
constituents, but rather to embody their common or group inter-
ests only. If so, the privilege cannot be invoked on behalf of the
organization or its representatives in their official capacity.46
Using this test, Justice Murphy found that a labor union, as well as its
officers, could not invoke the personal privilege against self-
incrimination.47
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court expanded White in Bellis v.
United States.48 The Court held that a member of a dissolved three-
man law partnership who had been subpoenaed to produce partner-
ship records could not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
to refuse to produce the records. 9 Justice Marshall, after stating that
the case required the Court to explore the "outer limits" of White,5 0
concluded that the White test did not render the "collective entity"
exception inapplicable simply because an organization embodied a
combination of personal and group interests; the presence of an orga-
nizational structure serving the group interest was sufficient to make
the exception apply. Justice Marshall stated that the formulation in
White could not be "reduced to a simple proposition based solely
upon the size of the organization. It is well settled that no privilege
can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of
how small the corporation may be."'"
Expanding on a concept formulated in Couch v. United States, 2
Justice Marshall also explained that expectation of privacy was a
rationale for the corporate entity exception. 3 In Couch, the Court
held that a taxpayer could not assert the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to withhold from the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice books and records that she had turned over to her accountant.5 4
46. Id. at 701.
47. Id. at 704.
48. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
49. Id. at 100-01. The defendant attorney argued that he could refuse to produce the
records because the Court in Boyd had allowed a partnership to claim the privilege against self-
incrimination when asked to produce a business invoice. Id. at 94-95. Justice Marshall
responded that the Court had decided Boyd at an "early stage in the development of ... Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence" when an invoice was treated as a private paper and that "it was
only after Boyd had held that the Fifth Amendment privilege applied to the compelled
production of documents that the question of the extension of this principle to the records of
artificial entities arose." Id. at 95 n.2. Boyd, therefore, did not decide "the issue presented" in
Bellis. Id.
50. Id. at 94.
51. Id. at 100. Justice Marshall added, however, that "it might be a different case if it
involved a small family parnership." Id. at 101. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
52. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
53. 417 U.S. at 91-92.
54. The Court stated:
We do indeed believe that actual possession of documents bears the most
[Vol. 40:793
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The Court found that there was no legitimate expectation of privacy
in this area.55 Neither could the taxpayer claim governmental com-
pulsion when the government was forcing only the accountant to pro-
duce the records.
56
The cases leading up to and including Bellis made it clear that
neither collective entities nor their custodians, acting in a representa-
tive capacity, could assert a fifth amendment privilege in order to
avoid production of entity documents. This well-settled rule, how-
ever, may have been due to the fact that before Fisher v. United
States 7 the Court did not distinguish between the contents of docu-
ments and the act of producing those documents when determining
whether a party could assert the privilege against self-incrimination.
Before Fisher, the Court never contemplated an "act of production"
privilege. By stating that the act of producing documents could be
testimonial,5" the Fisher Court altered the focus of fifth amendment
jurisprudence and created a new analytical problem for lower federal
courts.
III. FISHER, DOE, AND THE "ACT OF PRODUCTION" DOCTRINE
A. Fisher v. United States
In Fisher v. United States,59 taxpayers under investigation for
possible civil or criminal liability under the federal income tax laws
obtained certain documents prepared by their accountants and then
transferred the documents to their attorneys, who were assisting the
taxpayers in the investigation.' The Internal Revenue Service served
significant relationship to Fifth Amendment protections against governmental
compulsions upon the individual accused of crime. Yet situations may well arise
where constructive possession is so clear or the relinquishment of a possession is
so temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the
accused substantially intact.
Couch, 409 U.S. at 333.
In California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970, which required banks to maintain records of their customers' identities,
make microfilm copies of checks and similar instruments, and keep records of certain other
items. 416 U.S. 21 (1974). The Court rejected the arguments of certain plaintiffs that the
record keeping requirements imposed on the banks violated their fifth amendment rights,
pointing out that compelled production of incriminating evidence by a third party did not
constitute a fifth amendment violation. Id. at 55.
55. 409 U.S. at 335.
56. Id. at 336.
57. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
58. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 771 F.2d 143, 149 (6th Cir. 1985)
(Jones, J., dissenting), cert. denied, Morganstern v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985).
59. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
60. Id. at 394-95.
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summonses on the attorneys that directed them to produce the docu-
ments, but the attorneys refused to comply, claiming that enforce-
ment of the summonses would "involve compulsory self-
incrimination of the taxpayers, would involve a seizure of the papers
without necessary compliance with the Fourth Amendment, and
would violate the taxpayers' right to communicate in confidence"
with them.6
The Court, in an opinion by Justice White, held that enforcement
of the summonses against the taxpayers' attorneys would not violate
the taxpayers' fifth amendment rights.62 Justice White wrote that
although the court:
had often stated that one of the several purposes served by the con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination is that of protecting
personal privacy, . . .[it had] never on any ground, personal pri-
vacy included, applied the fifth amendment to prevent the other-
wise proper acquisition or use of evidence which, in the Court's
view, did not involve compelled testimonial self-incrimination of
some sort.63
The Court distanced itself from previous opinions, such as Beis,
which had stated that the fifth amendment had privacy underpin-
nings. 6" Justice White made it clear that the majority in Fisher did
not agree with the broad statements of privacy in those cases: "We
cannot cut the Fifth Amendment completely loose from the moorings
of its language, and make it serve as a general protector of privacy-a
word not mentioned in its text and a concept directly addressed in the
Fourth Amendment. 65
Although the Court seemed to eliminate any protection of pri-
vacy from the fifth amendment, Justice White stated that the fifth
61. Id. at 395.
62. Id. at 414. Justice White reasoned that enforcement of the summons against the
attorneys did not "compel" the taxpayers to do anything and certainly did not compel them to
be witnesses against themselves. Id. at 397. The case did not present a situation where
constructive possession was so clear as to leave the personal compulsion against the taxpayer
substantially intact. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 333 (1973).
Enforcement of the summons did not violate the attorney-client privilege, because the
records in question were "pre-existing" documents and could have been sought from the
attorney as long as they could have been obtained from the taxpayer. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403-
05. The dispositive question, therefore, was whether the Court could require the taxpayer
himself to produce the documents. Id. at 405. Because the defendant accountants prepared the
documents, the documents did not contain the taxpayer's testimonial declarations. The
taxpayer, therefore, could not refuse to produce the documents. Id, at 409-10.
63. Id. at 399.
64. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973); Telan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Davis v. United States, 328
U.S. 582 (1946).
65. 425 U.S. at 401.
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amendment could protect against the act of producing evidence if it
were testimonial:
The act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena nev-
ertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from
the contents of the papers produced. Compliance with the sub-
poena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and
their possession or control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate
the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the
subpoena.66
Justice White concluded that, in the case before the Court, testimonial
aspects of production were not present because the existence and loca-
tion of the documents in question were a foregone conclusion.67
Because the Court announced a new analytical framework with-
out providing much guidance,68 lower courts had difficulty applying
the new "act of production" doctrine to different factual settings.69
The Court provided some much needed guidance in United States v.
Doe.
66. Id. at 410. One commentator has noted: "That production of evidence may itself be
testimonial is at best an elusive idea." Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the
Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HARV. L. REV. 683, 686
(1982). Justice Marshall, who concurred in Fisher, seemed to agree, calling the Court's focus
on the testimonial aspects of production "technical" and "somewhat esoteric." 425 U.S. at 431
(Marshall, J., concurring). See also Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for
Constitutional Change, 37 U. CINN. L. REV. 671, 702 (1968) (The argument that compulsory
production involves an implicit testimonial authentication "reeks of the oil lamp."). For an
examination of different approaches to implicit authentication of documents, see Note, supra at
686-90.
67. 425 U.S. at 411.
68. See Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents-Cutting Fisher's Tangled
Line, 49 Mo. L. REv. 439 (1984).
69. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 9, 1983, 722 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Fisher did not extend protection to production of a collective entity's records); United States
v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983) (taxpayer could not refuse to produce his
accountant's workpapers); In re First National Bank, 701 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1983) (anti-tax
groups' fifth amendment rights not violated by subpoena directed at bank, but government had
to show a compelling need to obtain the documents if enforcement of subpoena would likely
chill associational rights); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 646 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1981) (fifth
amendment protection applicable to sole proprietor's business records is same as protection
applicable to an individual's records); United States v. Greenleaf, 546 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1977)
(custodian's personal privilege should not bar production of an organization's financial
records); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Passports), 544 F. Supp. 721 (S.D. Fla.
1982) (requiring witness to produce passport for presentation to grand jury did not involve
testimonial communication but witness was entitled to an order mandating that his act of
production not be used as evidence against him); United States v. Challman, 520 F. Supp. 64
(S.D. Ind. 1981) (production of gospel music cassettes pursuant to I.R.S. summons did not
involve testimonial self-incrimination); In re Bernstein, 425 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Fla. 1977)
(defendant's fifth amendment right would be violated if forced to produce tape recordings of
conversations with others which he himself made and which were in his possession).
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B. United States v. Doe
In United States v. Doe,7 ° the Supreme Court of the United States
applied Fisher's "act of production" doctrine to a sole proprietorship
and reaffirmed that the fifth amendment did not protect the contents
of business documents.7 In Doe, a grand jury investigating corrup-
tion of county and municipal contracts served five subpoenas72 on the
owner of several sole proprietorships. The sole proprietor filed a
motion to quash the subpoenas in federal district court, and the Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey granted the motion.73 The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed and held that the
grand jury could not subpoena the sole proprietor's business
records.74 The court of appeals reasoned that production of the docu-
ments would result in an "impermissible incriminating 'testimonial
communication.' "7 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Powell, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court disagreed
with the court of appeals' conclusion that the contents of a sole pro-
prietor's business records were privileged because the fifth amend-
ment provided protection only from compelled self-incrimination:
Respondent does not contend that he prepared the documents
70. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
71. Id. at 610-12.
72. The third subpoena sought production of:
(1) general ledgers; (2) general journals; (3) cash disbursement journals; (4) petty
cash books and vouchers; (5) purchase journals; (6) vouchers; (7) paid bills; (8)
invoices; (9) cash receipts journal; (10) billings; (11) bank statements; (12)
cancelled checks and check stubs; (13) payroll records; (14) contracts and copies
of contracts, including all retainer agreements; (15) financial statements; (16)
bank deposit tickets; (17) retained copies of partnership income tax returns; (18)
retained copies of payroll tax returns; (19) accounts payable ledger; (20) accounts
receivable ledger; (21) telephone company statement of calls and telegrams, and
all telephone toll slips; (22) records of all escrow, trust, or fiduciary accounts
maintained on behalf of clients; (23) safe deposit box records; (24) records of all
purchases and sales of all stocks and bonds; (25) names and addresses of all
partners, associates, and employees; (26) W-2 forms of each partner, associate,
and employees; (27) workpapers; (28) copies of tax returns.
Id. at 607 n. 1.
73. The district court found that enforcement of the subpoenas "would compel
[respondent] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession, and that they are
authentic. These communications, if made under compulsion of a court decree, would violate
[respondent's] Fifth Amendment rights." Matter of Grand Jury Empaneled March 19, 1980,
541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 680 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
74. The court held that Fisher had not made a complete break with Boyd and that
therefore "an individual's business papers, as well as his personal records, [could not] be
subpoenaed by a grand jury." Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d at
334 (citing I.C.C. v. Gould, 629 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981)).
75. Id. The Court, in Bellis, stated that 'the privilege [against self-incrimination] applies to
the business records of the sole proprietor ...." Bellis, 417 U.S. at 87-88.
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involuntarily or that the subpoena would force him to restate,
repeat, or affirm the truth of their contents. The fact that the
records are in respondent's possession is irrelevant to the determi-
nation of whether the creation of the records was compelled. We
therefore hold that the contents of those records are not
privileged.76
The Court, however, declined to disturb the finding of both the dis-
trict court and the court of appeals that the sole proprietor's act of
producing the records would be both testimonial and self-incriminat-
ing.77 Relying on this finding, the Court held that the grand jury
could not compel the sole proprietor to produce the documents with-
out a statutory grant of use immunity78 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002
and 6003.79 The government had urged the Court to adopt a doctrine
76. Doe, 465 U.S. at 611-12. Justice Powell also stated that "[i]f the party asserting the
Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the document, no compulsion is present
and the contents of the document are not privileged." Id. at 612 n.10. This statement,
"hidden" in a footnote, may signal the end of fifth amendment protection for the contents of
private papers such as diaries or letters. Because most, if not all, "private papers" are
voluntarily composed, no compulsion would be involved and the contents of the papers would
not be privileged. But see infra note 84 (Most lower courts have held the fifth amendment
protects the contents of private papers in some manner.).
77. The District Court's finding essentially rests on its determination of factual
issues. Therefore, we will not overturn that finding unless it has no support in
the record. Traditionally, we also have been reluctant to disturb findings of fact
in which two courts below have concurred. We therefore decline to overturn the
finding of the District Court in this regard, where, as here, it has been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
Id. at 614 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 617.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or
ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or a subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over the
proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the
witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination; but not testimony or other information compelled
under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such
testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal
case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982).
18 U.S.C. § 6003 provides:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or
provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the
United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district
court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall
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of "constructive use immunity," 0 but the Court refused to "extend
the jurisdiction of courts to include prospective grants of use immu-
nity in the absence of the formal request that the statute requires.""1
Justice O'Connor concurred, writing to make explicit what she
believed was implicit in the Court's opinion: "the Fifth Amendment
provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of
any kind." 2 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred
in part and dissented in part. Justice Marshall believed that the Court
erred by reversing the court of appeals' conclusion that the contents
of the sole proprietor's documents were privileged because the court
of appeals' judgment did not rest on the disposition of that issue.8 3
Justice Marshall also argued that, contrary to Justice O'Connor's con-
issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the
United States attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual to
give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to give or provide
on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become
effective as provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General,
the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General,
request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to
the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other
information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982). See also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (upholding
the constitutionality of statutory use immunity).
80. Under "constructive" use immunity, "the courts would impose a requirement on the
Government not to use the incriminatory aspects of the act of production against the person
claiming the privilege even though the statutory procedures [had] not been followed." Doe, 465
U.S. at 616.
81. Of course, courts generally suppress compelled, incriminating testimony that
results from a violation of a witness' Fifth Amendment rights. The difference
between that situation and the Government's theory of constructive use
immunity is that in the latter it is the grant of judicially enforceable use
immunity that compels the witness to testify. In the former situation, exclusion
of the witness' testimony is used to deter the Government from future violations
of witnesses' Fifth Amendment rights.
Id. at 616 n. 16 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor believes that Fisher "sounded
the death-knell for Boyd." Id. This conclusion seems to be correct even though Doe did not
specifically deal with the "private papers" issue. See supra note 76. But see infra note 84 and
accompanying text (Most lower courts have held that the fifth amendment protects in some
way the contents of private papers.).
83. Doe, 465 U.S. at 618 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed with Justice Marshall. Both the
court of appeals and the Supreme Court of the United States had reached the same
conclusion-the subpoena had to be quashed. Because the court of appeals appropriately
resolved the "act of production" issue, Justices Marshall and Stevens believed that its
judgment should have been affirmed. Id. at 619-23 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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tention, the Doe Court did not consider "whether the Fifth Amend-
ment provides protection for the contents of 'private papers of any
kind.' "84
Justice Powell's majority opinion in Doe addressed only the nar-
row issue before the Court. As a result, it is not clear if the Court
intended the "act of production" doctrine to extend to custodians of
corporate records. Recently, the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have addressed the issue left open in Doe.
IV. THREE APPROACHES
A. Brown
In In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown),85 a grand jury served a sub-
poena duces tecum 86 on the sole owner of a professional corpora-tion.8 7  The owner resisted the enforcement of the subpoena by
84. Id. at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See supra notes 76
and 82. Although Doe may have signaled the end of fifth amendment protection for "private
papers," the Supreme Court of the United States "has been unwilling to concede that there
may not be certain types of papers which should be accorded special protection." Bradley,
Constitutional Protection for Private Papers, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 462 (1981).
Most lower courts, in both pre-Doe and post-Doe cases, have held or stated in dictum that
the fifth amendment still protects in some way the contents of "private" or personal papers.
See, e.g., Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1985) (fifth amendment privilege did not
apply to contents of personal records that related to property of bankrupt's estate, because the
information relating to the property was not so intimately personal as to evoke serious concern
over privacy interests); United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1099 (1984) (contents of documents less private than personal diaries are not
protected by the fifth amendment); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 657 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir. 1981) (fifth amendment protects individuals from government compelled production of
personal documents); United States v. Mackey, 647 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1981) (personal
notations on corporate documents not enough to shroud the documents with fifth amendment
protections reserved for purely personal papers); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981) (Fifth Circuit has rejected interpretations of Fisher and
Andresen that would either limit the Boyd principle to non-business records or abolish it
altogether); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1979) (compelling
production of an individual's books and papers to be used against him in a legal proceeding
violates the fourth and fifth amendments); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas S. Feb. 27, 1984, 599
F. Supp. 1006 (E.D. Wash. 1984) (with reference to contents, if documents are authored by the
person named in the subpoena, are nonbusiness in nature, and contain recorded thoughts so
personal that their disclosure would infringe on whatever residual privacy rights remain
protected by the fifth amendment, then those documents are privileged). Contra In re Kave,
760 F.2d 343 (1st Cir. 1985) (Fisher and Doe limited Boyd's "private papers" doctrine by
holding that the compelled production of such documents is prohibited only if there were
testimonial aspects in the act of production itself); United States v. Goerhring, 742 F.2d 1323
(1 1th Cir. 1984) (Doe overruled Boyd and held that books and records sought by subpoena or
summons were no longer to be given fifth amendment protection).
85. 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc).
86. See supra note 19 (defining a subpoena).
87. The subpoena required the sole owner, James Brown, to appear before a federal grand
jury and bring with him "all workpapers, reports, records, correspondence and copies of tax
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asserting that his authenticating testimony with regard to the records
sought would constitute compelled self-incrimination. The District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that "because the
records [sought] belonged to a corporation, [the owner] had no privi-
lege against self-incrimination, either with respect to the contents of
the records, or with respect to their authentication before the grand
jury"" and held the owner in civil contempt for refusing its order
enforcing the subpoena.8 9 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed. The court held that the trial court could hold a witness in
contempt for refusing to authenticate records only if it found that
there was no likelihood of self-incrimination or if the government
granted use immunity to the witness. 90
Judge Gibbons, writing for the majority,91 stated that the issue
was "whether [the sole owner could] be compelled by a subpoena to
give testimony before the grand jury, verbally or by a non-verbal com-
municative act, authenticating those records."92 Judge Gibbons
expanded on Fisher's notion of the communicative aspects of the act
of production by equating nonverbal communicative acts with testi-
mony.93 Equating production to testimony, however, did not com-
pletely resolve the issue before the court. Judge Gibbons had to
address United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp.,94 in which the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Learned
Hand, held that the trial court could compel the secretary-treasurer of
a corporation to give oral testimony as to the authenticity of corpo-
rate records even though the testimony would result in self-incrimina-
tion.95 Judge Gibbons reasoned that the Third Circuit had never
adopted the A ustin-Bagley exception to the fifth amendment and that
the exception was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent treat-
returns" in his possession or under his control "relating to accounting services performed by
[him] or under [his] supervision" on behalf of parties listed in the subpoena. Brown, 768 F.2d
at 531.
88. Id. at 525.
89. The district court did not find that possession of the records was not of evidentiary
significance, nor that production of the records would not be used for evidentiary purposes. Id.
at 526.
90. Id.
91. The court heard the case en banc. Of the eleven judges who heard the case, five joined
Judge Gibbons' majority opinion, two judges concurred, and three judges dissented.
92. Brown, 768 F.2d at 526.
93. Id. at 527.
94. 31 F.2d 229 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 863 (1929).
95. Id. at 233-34. Although Judge Hand recognized that there was a "possible, if tenuous
distinction" between producing documents and giving testimony to authenticate them, he
reasoned that production encompassed authentication and that, "since the production can be
forced, it [can] be made effective by compelling the producer to declare that the documents are
genuine." Id. at 234.
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ment of the fifth amendment privilege.96
Although he acknowledged that Fisher ended fifth amendment
protection for the contents of business documents, Judge Gibbons
stated that Fisher recognized "that testimonial communication of any
kind was protected if it might tend to incriminate. ' 97 In support of
this proposition, Judge Gibbons relied on Curcio v. United States,98 in
which the Supreme Court held that the secretary-treasurer of a union
could refuse to answer questions concerning the whereabouts of miss-
ing union books and records that had been subpoenaed, but not pro-
duced, by invoking the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.99 Although Curcio was distinguishable from Austin-
Bagley, "0 Judge Gibbons emphasized that the Supreme Court in
Fisher focused on aspects of production that the Austin-Bagley court
thought irrelevant. 1 '
After discussing Curcio, Judge Gibbons dismissed the govern-
ment's argument that Doe was limited to sole proprietorships. Judge
Gibbons explained that Fisher and Doe "make the significant factor,
for the privilege of self-incrimination, neither the nature of the entity
which owns the documents, nor the contents of the documents."
Rather, the significant factor is the "communicative or noncommuni-
cative nature of the arguably incriminating disclosures sought to be
compelled." 102 The majority opinion also pointed out that the federal
rules of evidence allowed authentication by presentation of sufficient
evidence and added that when a witness is required for authentica-
tion, most businesses had agents who could testify without fear of self-
incrimination. °3 Furthermore, the government also could grant use
immunity to the authenticating witness."° Because the district court
did not give the owner an opportunity to establish that production
96. Brown, 768 F.2d at 526.
97. Id. at 527.
98. 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
99. The Curcio court distinguished Austin-Bagley, reasoning that requiring a custodian to
identify or authenticate records produced only made explicit what was implicit in the
production itself. Id. at 125.
100. At the time of Curcio, the Supreme Court did not distinguish between the contents of
documents and the act of producing the documents. If the production of corporate documents
were not privileged, then testimony authenticating the documents might not add to what
already had been revealed when the documents were produced.
101. Brown, 768 F.2d at 528.
102. Id.
103. "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what its proponent claims." FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
104. The government had not requested the trial court to direct the corporation to appoint
an agent. Brown, 768 F.2d at 529 n.4.
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and authentication would tend to incriminate him, the majority
reversed the order holding the owner in contempt.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Becker stated that he agreed with
Judge Garth's dissent that Fisher and Doe did not change the corpo-
rate entity exception. Judge Becker, however, argued that the case
involved "testimonial incrimination" beyond that inherent in the act
of production because of the wording of the grand jury subpoena. 105
Judge Becker read the subpoena to be an interrogatory that asked the
owner whether he had prepared the documents listed in the subpoena.
According to Judge Becker, the owner's compliance with the sub-
poena would potentially result in more incriminating testimony than
necessarily resulted from production of corporate records. °6 Judge
Becker believed, however, that if the government desired, it could
obtain the documents by eliminating the interrogatory character of
the subpoena.I 7
Judge Garth dissented and argued that the majority erred in
treating the case as one involving compelled testimony rather than
compelled production of corporate documents.'0 8 Judge Garth noted
that the Supreme Court had yet to answer whether the fifth amend-
ment privilege applied when a subpoena directed a professional one-
man corporation to produce records and the production of those
records could incriminate him individually."0 9 Judge Garth believed
that the subpoena never asked the owner in the case at hand to testify
for purposes of authentication or identification and that the district
court held him in contempt because he "failed and refused to comply
with the order of the Court to provide the subpoenaed documents." 1 0
Lastly, Judge Garth explained that Doe, in focusing on the testimonial
aspects of the act of production, did not change the corporate entity
exception.' 1'
105. Judge Becker focused on the words "accounting services performed by [him] or under
[his] supervision." Id. at 531 (Becker, J., concurring).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 531-32.
108. Id. at 532 (Garth, J., dissenting).
109. Although the issue of the one-man corporation was addressed in Grant v. United
States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913), at that time the Supreme Court did not focus on the testimonial
aspects of the act of production. See supra p. 798.
110. 768 F.2d at 534 (Garth, J., dissenting).
1!1. "[T]he [collective entity] doctrine survives, not because production by the custodian
has no testimonial ramification, but because the custodian has waived, to a limited extent, his
fifth amendment right upon assuming the duties of his office." Id. at 538 (Garth, J.,
dissenting).
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B. In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum
In In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 1 2 two sub-
poenas were served at the offices of a corporation that a federal grand
jury was investigating. Both subpoenas called for testimony and the
production of the corporation's business records. One subpoena was
addressed to the corporation's "custodian of records.""' 3 The custo-
dian moved to quash the subpoenas, but the district court refused to
do so after limiting the subpoenas to corporate business records. The
district court directed that someone who was not a target of the grand
jury investigation produce the records and stated that any employee
of the corporation who worked in the main office (where the records
were kept) could produce the records." 4 The custodian appealed the
district judge's order, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, in an opinion by Judge Pratt, affirmed the order.' 5
Judge Pratt explained that a corporate representative normally
could not claim a fifth amendment privilege against producing corpo-
rate records, regardless of whether the corporation was large or
small I6 because no self-incrimination problem exists when a corpora-
tion is asked to produce records. Although some individual must act
on behalf of the corporation, the employee producing the records
"would not be attesting to his personal possession of them but to their
existence and possession by the corporation.""' 7 If the custodian of
records would be incriminated, then the corporation could appoint an
agent to produce the records.1 ' Judge Pratt stated that because the
112. 769 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1985).
113. Id. at 54. The custodian was the corporation's majority shareholder and sole operating
officer as well as a target of the grand jury's investigation. Id.
114. Id.
115. The government had moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the custodian
could not appeal the order denying the motion to quash without first resisting enforcement and
enduring the penalty of a citation for contempt. See In re Katz, 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1980).
The custodian argued that his appeal fell under the exception created by Perlman v. United
States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), "which allows an immediate appeal from the denial of a motion to
quash the subpoena without first... being found in contempt, 'when the subpoena is directed
to a third party and the one seeking to quash the subpoenas claims that its enforcement will
violate one or more of his constitutional rights.' " Two Grand Jury Subpoenae, 769 F.2d at 54
(citations omitted). The court denied the government's motion, stating that the flaws in the
custodian's argument became apparent only after consideration of his fifth amendment claims.
Id. at 55.
116. 769 F.2d at 56.
117. Id. at 57.
118. Compare United States v. Barth, 745 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1356 (1985)(corporation has duty to appoint agent) with United States v. Hankins, 565 F.2d
1344 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979)(improper for court to direct president of
corporation to produce witness who would not claim fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination).
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district judge specifically excluded any grand jury target from having
to produce the records and provided that the corporation could select
an employee to produce the records, any danger of self-incrimination
was removed.' 19
In the second part of his opinion, Judge Pratt explained that Doe
did not change existing law regarding corporate records. He argued
that Doe's holding was predicated on the fact that the documents at
issue were documents of a sole proprietorship, and not corporate
records, and that Doe failed to discuss the "long-standing rules set
down by the Supreme Court that have limited, emphatically, the Fifth
Amendment privilege in the corporate setting."' 2 ° Lastly, Judge
Pratt stated that Doe did not limit or overrule Bellis 2' and concluded
that the bright line of Bellis was still valid.
122
C. Morganstern
The question presented in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Mor-
ganstern)2 ' was whether a subpoena duces tecum requiring the pro-
duction of partnership and corporate records should be quashed on
the ground that production of the documents would violate the
defendants' fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrim-
ination. Citing Doe, the defendants sought to quash the subpoena
served on their attorney.' 24 The district court denied the motion to
quash, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, con-
cluding that the defendants could not be required to produce the
requested records absent a grant of use immunity.'25 A majority of
the judges in active service voted to rehear the case en banc, thereby
vacating the panel decision. 26 On rehearing, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Judge Lively, writing for the majority, 27 stated that Bellis' "col-
lective entity" rule established that no artificial organization could
utilize the personal privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, an
119. 769 F.2d at 57.
120. Id. at 58.
121. 417 U.S. 85 (1974). For a discussion of Bellis, see supra notes 48-56 and
accompanying text.
122. Two Grand Jury Subpoenae, 769 F.2d at 59. The "bright line" of Bellis restricts a
collective entity's use of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
123. 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, Morganstern v. United States, 106 S.
Ct. 594 (1985).
124. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstern), 747 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1984),
vacated, 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1985).
125. See supra note 79 (quoting the statutes that provide for use immunity).
126. 6th CIR. R. 14.
127. Eight judges joined the majority opinion, and two judges dissented.
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individual acting in a representative capacity likewise could not assert
his personal privilege against self-incrimination to withhold the
records. 2 ' Judge Lively explained that Fisher, while changing the
focus of inquiry from contents of documents to the act of production,
did not retreat from the collective entity rule announced in Bellis.129
He pointed out that on two previous occasions 30 the Supreme Court
had applied Fisher to fifth amendment challenges of summons or sub-
poenas without discarding the collective entity exception on either
occasion.
Doe, according to the majority in Morganstern, did not hint that
it announced a departure from the collective entity rule. Indeed, Jus-
tice Powell's opinion for the Court in Doe had addressed a narrow
issue and cited Bellis with approval. 3' After stating that a custodian
of corporate records could not assert the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, Judge Lively said:
It is well settled in this circuit that if the government later attempts
to implicate the custodian on the basis of the act of production,
evidence of that fact is subject to a motion to suppress. 'Such proof
would seek to add testimonial value to the otherwise testimony-free
act of production." 32
In dissent, Judge Jones, joined by Judge Martin, argued that Doe
established "the principle that, without reference to the content or
origin of documents sought by a subpoena, the compelled act of pro-
ducing documents may be testimonial and self-incriminating, and
therefore privileged under the Fifth Amendment."'' 3 Judge Jones
pointed out that Bellis and the other corporate entity exception cases
were not concerned with the act of production, and therefore Doe and
Bellis supplemented rather than conflicted with one another. 3 4 More
importantly, Judge Jones said:
The majority distorts the rationale of Doe by promulgating a rule
that the act of producing corporate documents is always free of
testimonial implications ... [We] reject the majority's conclusion
that the testimonial aspects of an act of producing corporate docu-
ments arises only at trial when the government seeks to introduce
128. 771 F.2d at 148.
129. Id. at 147.
130. See In re Grand Jury Empaneled Mar. 8, 1983, 722 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
dismissed sub nom. Butcher v. United States, 465 U.S. 1085 (1984); United States v. Schlansky,
709 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984).
131. 771 F.2d at 147.
132. Id. at 148. This holding appears to be in conflict with Doe's refusal to adopt a doctrine
of constructive use immunity. See supra notes 80-81 and infra note 195.
133. 771 F.2d at 148 (Jones, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 149.
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incriminating evidence concerning the act of production.' 35
D. From Clear Precedent to a State of Confusion
Brown, Two Grand Jury Subpoenae, and Morganstern demon-
strate the confusion concerning the proper scope of the act of produc-
tion doctrine. The three cases differ both in their approach and
resolution of this issue. The courts in Two Grand Jury Subpoenae and
Morganstern required custodians of corporate records to produce cor-
porate records, 36 while the court in Brown permitted the custodian to
demonstrate on remand that the act of production would be
incriminating. '"
Although the courts in Two Grand Jury Subpoenae and Morgan-
stern refused to apply the act of production doctrine to corporate cus-
todians, they disagreed in their reasons for not doing so. The Second
Circuit in Two Grand Jury Subpoenae indicated that a custodian's act
would not be incriminating,138 while the Sixth Circuit in Morganstern
held that the act of production was not testimonial. 39 Furthermore,
the courts differed in their solutions to the problems created when the
government seeks to use a custodian's act of production as evidence
against him. These solutions included the appointment of an agent to
produce the documents in Two Grand Jury Subpoenae, " the grant of
statutory use immunity in Brown, "' and the suppression of evidence
at trial in Morganstern.142 The differing rationales and results of the
three cases demonstrate that much ambiguity exists concerning the
overlap between the entity exception and the act of production
doctrine.
Until recently, there was no confusion concerning the application
of the fifth amendment to subpoenaed corporate documents; neither a
collective entity nor its custodians could assert the privilege against
self-incrimination. 43 This precedent had been continuous and
unambigous since the Supreme Court's decisions in Hale v. Henkel
and Wilson v. United States in the early 1900's.'
135. Id.
136. For an analysis of Two Grand Jury Subpoenae and Morganstern, see supra notes 112-32
and accompanying text.
137. See supra p. 809.
138. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
141. See supra p. 809.
142. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
144. For a discussion of the development of the entity exception, see supra notes 16-58 and
accompanying text. The act of production doctrine enunciated in Fisher v. United States, 425
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The confusion that Doe and its progeny caused may generate
practical and analytical problems as well. Presumably, much of the
evidence that the government uses to prosecute collective entities
comes from documents belonging to these entities. Until the Supreme
Court establishes whether custodians of entity records can assert the
fifth amendment privilege, lower courts, prosecutors, and grand juries
will act with uncertainty when trying to obtain entity documents
through subpoena or summons. More importantly, those who possess
entity documents will be unsure of their rights.
V. How FISHER AND DOE AFFECTED THE ENTITY EXCEPTION
The existing confusion in the lower courts illustrated by the deci-
sions in Brown, Two Grand Jury Subpoenae, and Morganstern arose
out of Doe's application of the "act of production" doctrine to busi-
ness records. 4 5 Doe's application of the act of production doctrine to
the business records of a sole proprietor may have changed, in several
respects, the previously clear scope of the entity exception. First, the
act of production doctrine may apply to custodians of corporate
records, because courts may interpret the doctrine as a new protection
for all persons, regardless of their professional capacity, 46 or because
courts may view the custodian's act of production as testimony,
which has always been privileged.147 Second, the reasoning of Doe
and Fisher may indicate that the collective entity exception has
become a rule without rationale. 48 The remainder of this section will
U.S. 391 (1976) and applied in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) made the scope of the
entity exception less clear.
145. Although Doe was the basis for the present controversy among the three circuits, some
lower courts do not view Doe as affecting the entity exception. In United States v. G.& G.
Advertising Co., the court indicated that Doe is relevant only when the target is a sole
proprietor. 592 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D. Miss. 1984). In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Feb.
27, 1984, the court rejected the idea that a court may apply the "act of production" doctrine
when partnership records are subpoenaed. 599 F. Supp. 1006 (E.D. Wash. 1984). The court
declined to follow the cases in which the Second Circuit applied the act of production doctrine
to corporate records. See infra notes 202-05. The court stated that "when coupled with the
Supreme Court's holding in Beffis.... the weight of authority leads this court to conclude that
Petitioner may not assert the 'act of production' doctrine in regard to any . . . partnership
records in his possession." 599 F. Supp. at 1013. In In re Heuwetter, the court stated that the
custodian had failed to show how his case differed from cases holding that representatives
must produce subpoenaed documents. 584 F. Supp. 119, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The court
reasoned that a custodian is not able to pass the doctrine's requirement of testimonial
incrimination. Id. at 126. See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text. The court also said
that the custodian's act of production "[would] add little or nothing to the sum total of the
Government's information." 584 F. Supp. at 124.
146. For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
147. For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
148. For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 161-93 and accompanying text.
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analyze the reasoning inherent in these views.
A. The Application of Doe
One interpretation of Doe that lends support to the view that the
act of production doctrine affected the collective entity exception is
that Doe formulated a new type of fifth amendment protection.
Because the Doe Court did not expressly limit the act of protection
doctrine to sole proprietors, the protection may apply to all persons,
including custodians of corporate records, who can show that the act
of producing documents will be testimonial and incriminating. This
new protection is distinct from the "contents-based" privilege that
was available only to sole proprietors before Doe. 149
This interpretation of Doe assumes that the "collective entity"
exception was not a general rule that absolutely denied fifth amend-
ment protection to custodians of collective entity documents. Instead,
proponents of this view argue that the entity exception only prevented
a custodian from claiming a fifth amendment privilege in the contents
of the collective entity documents. 15 0 The entity exception, therefore,
would not bar a custodian's assertion of a privilege in the act of pro-
duction. According to this view, the sole relevant factor in applying
Doe is whether the act of production is testimonial and incriminating.
Many of the cases that applied the collective entity exception
employed general language that indicates that the entity exception
also prevents a custodian from claiming an act of production privi-
lege.' 51 One should not, however, construe this general language to
apply to the act of production doctrine. Because the courts employ-
ing this general language had not contemplated an act of production
doctrine at the time of their decisions, 152 their language could not
149. See Morganstern, 771 F.2d at 148 (Jones, J., dissenting) (arguing that Doe supplements
the Bellis rule). Doe, however, made it clear that the contents of a sole proprietor's business
records are not privileged. See supra p. 804-05.
150. Id. Bellis and its predecessors draw a distinction between personal documents and
collective documents when evaluating a claim that a document's contents are not privileged.
The broad language of Bellis was not written to foreclose an act of production privilege for
corporate documents. Id.
151. In Bellis v. United States, the Court stated, in dicta, that "no privilege can be claimed
by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation may be." 417
U.S. 85, 100 (1974). The Court, in White, also used language that would seem to foreclose any
act of production privilege for custodians: "[T]he official records and documents of the
organization that are held by [the custodians] in a representative rather than personal capacity
cannot be the subject of the personal privilege against self-incrimination even though
production of the papers might tend to incriminate them personally." 322 U.S. 694, 699
(1944).
152. The Court decided White and Bellis before it announced the act of production doctrine
in Fisher.
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have been meant to foreclose an act of production privilege. 5 3
B. Prior Privilege in Testimony
The entity exception, while forcing custodians to produce
records, has at the same time allowed custodians to assert the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination when asked to tes-
tify.I54 Because Fisher and Doe redefined testimonial communication
to include certain acts of production, one may now interpret the cus-
todian's privilege not to incriminate himself to include a privilege to
forbear from testimonial acts of production. Dicta in Curcio approv-
ing United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp. 15 indicated that courts may
compel authentication testimony from custodians who turn over
records.15 6  Because an act of production is testimonial when it
authenticates documents, 5 7 this dicta in Curcio would appear to indi-
cate that courts may compel such production.' Such a conclusion,
however, would ignore the meaning of the act of production doctrine.
Fisher and Doe indicate that an act of production is testimonial and
incriminating when it authenticates documents.' 59 The distinction in
Austin-Bagley, between testimony that authenticates and other testi-
mony, is therefore no longer valid, because courts now consider testi-
monial acts that authenticate documents privileged. 16°
153. Morganstern, 771 F.2d at 149 (Jones, J., dissenting).
154. See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 89-90 ("privilege... should be 'limited to its historic function of
protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own
testimony or personal records.' " (emphasis added)); Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 124
(1957) ("[A custodian] cannot lawfully be compelled in the absence of a grant of adequate
immunity from prosecution to condemn himself by his own oral testimony.") See also Wilson
v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (distinguished the production aspect of a subpoena from
the ad testificandum clause of the subpoena, implying that testimony is privileged).
155. 31 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1929).
156. 354 U.S. at 125; See also Brown, 768 F.2d at 527.
157. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
158. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 523 F. Supp. 107, 108 (E.D. Penn. 1981) (the
personal privilege in Curcio "does not include the identification of corporate documents
already produced. Requiring a corporate agent ... to identify documents already produced
merely makes explicit what is implicit in the production itself."); Heidt, supra note 68, at 486.
Although the Curcio Court recognized the Austin-Bagley distinction, dicta in Bussell v.
United States indicates that such a distinction between testimony auxiliary to production
authenticating the documents and other testimony may not be important. 396 U.S. 1229
(1969). Citing Curcio, the Court wrote that "all oral testimony by individuals can properly be
compelled only by exchange of immunity for waiver of privilege." Id. at 1230 (quoting Shapiro
v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 27 (1948)).
Other courts have reiterated the distinction and required corporate custodians to either
produce the documents or state under oath that they are not in their possession or under their
control. United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 761, reh'g denied, 462 U.S. 1112 (1983);
United States v. O'Henry's Film Works, Inc., 598 F.2d 313, 318 (2d Cir. 1979).
159. See supra notes 66, 77 and accompanying text.
160. 768 F.2d at 527.
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The above discussion sets forth two competing interpretations of
Doe. One position argues that courts may not infer an end to the
long-standing corporate entity doctrine from the Supreme Court's
silence in Doe. The other view argues that the Doe Court applied the
act of production doctrine without any express limitation, and there-
fore, this new doctrine encompasses the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation which custodians of corporate records already hold. Although
the prior discussion indicates that the latter position is more reason-
able, the arguments center on determining the Court's intended scope
for the act of production doctrine. Because any attempt to determine
the Court's intent is speculative, a more useful analysis may be to
examine whether any valid rationale remains valid for the corporate
entity exception.
C. The Entity Exception: A Search for Rationales
Prior to Fisher, the Supreme Court, in Bellis, provided two ratio-
nales for the corporate entity exception. 161  First, the Bellis Court
explained that the privilege against self-incrimination "should be lim-
ited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual
from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or per-
sonal records."' 6 2 The Bellis Court, however, did not view the act of
production as including either testimony or personal records, both of
which were privileged. Fisher's redefinition of testimonial communi-
cation to include certain acts of production seems to transform a cus-
todian's act of production into a privileged act,'63 thereby under-
mining the rationale in Bellis that a custodian's fifth amendment
claim was not an assertion of a personal privilege.
The second rationale that the Bellis Court enunciated for the
entity exception was that corporate custodians lack an expectation of
privacy in entity documents. The Court stated that "the Fifth
Amendment 'respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling
and thought.' '"" A corporation or its representatives, therefore,
could not assert the privilege when corporate documents were subpoe-
naed, because no expectation of privacy existed with respect to the
financial records of an organized collective entity. 165
161. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
162. Id. at 89-90 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944)).
163. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
164. 417 U.S. at 91.
165. Id. at 92. The Court explained that no expectation of privacy exists as to corporate
documents, because access to the documents is generally guaranteed to others in the
organization. Id. Given this rationale, it would seem to follow that a one-man corporation has
an expectation of privacy in corporate documents. Nevertheless, the court indicated that "no
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The Fisher Court made this analysis irrelevant by explaining that
the fifth amendment does not protect against the disclosure of private
business information. 166 The distinction between collective entities
and sole proprietors with respect to subpoenaed business documents
was based on an expectation of privacy rationale. Fisher made this
distinction unimportant and undermined the expectation of privacy
rationale by holding that the fifth amendment is not a general protec-
tor of privacy.167
The original rationale that the Supreme Court provided for the
corporate entity exception was the notion of the state's "visitorial
powers."' 16' This concept provides that a state may subpoena corpo-
rate records because (1) a corporation is a mere creature of the state
and (2) the state needs to regulate corporations. 169 The Bellis Court
indicated, however, that an expectation of privacy rationale was "the
modem-day relevance of the visitorial powers doctrine relied upon by
the court in Wilson and other cases dealing with corporate
records." 70
The visitorial powers rationale may have relevance apart from
any expectation of privacy notions. In White v. United States, 171 the
Court demonstrated the value of a visitorial powers rationale:
The greater portion of evidence or wrongdoing by an organization
or its representatives is usually to be found in the official records
and documents of the organization. Were the cloak of the privilege
to be thrown around these impersonal records and documents,
effective enforcement of many federal and state laws would be
impossible. 172
The Court in White thus contended that because governmental bodies
and prosecutors need these documents to regulate these organizations,
privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the
corporation may be." Id. at 100.
But cf. Comment, Business Records and the Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-
Incrimination, 38 OHIO ST. L. J. 351, 371 (1977) (indicating that the Supreme Court had
rarely accepted the expectation of privacy notion of fifth amendment analysis). Compare Bellis
(stating that entities do not have an expectation of privacy in their documents for fifth
amendment purposes) with Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (implying that
businesses have an expectation of privacy in business records when the fourth amendment is
involved).
166. 425 U.S. at 401; see Heidt, supra note 68.
167. 425 U.S. at 401. One should note, however, that the fifth amendment may still protect
privacy in cases dealing with private papers. See supra note 84.
168. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906); Hair Indus. Ltd. v. United States, 340 F.2d
510 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
169. Hale, 201 U.S. at 74.
170. 417 U.S. at 92.
171. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
172. Id. at 700. For a related comment, see Heidt, supra note 68, at 449-50.
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courts should not allow custodians of collective entity documents to
refuse production of the entity's documents.
173
Even if courts extend the act of production doctrine to custodi-
ans, several theories concerning the application of the act of produc-
tion doctrine are so restrictive as to imply a rationale for the
continued viability of the corporate entity exception. The inference
arising from several cases 174 is that a corporate custodian cannot, or
can only rarely, meet the criteria for invoking the doctrine. Fisher, in
announcing the act of production doctrine, explicitly upheld the cor-
porate entity exception in dicta. The majority asserted that even
though the production of entity documents "tacitly admits their exist-
ence and their location in the hands of their possessor," the act is not
sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the privilege against self-
incrimination. 7- The Court failed to explain this assertion except to
say that "the existence and possession or control of the subpoenaed
documents [were] no more in issue than" in cases dealing with hand-
writing exemplars. 176  Justice Marshall, concurring in Fisher,
expanded on this belief. "Since the existence of corporate record
books is seldom in doubt, the verification of their existence may fairly
be termed not testimonial at all." ''77 These notions of the applicability
of the act of production doctrine to corporations support the view
expressed in Morganstern and in Two Grand Jury Subpoenae that the
custodian's act of production is rarely, if ever, a testimonial, incrimi-
nating act. 17
8
173. This pragmatic regulatory goal is questionable. The regulation of collective entities is
not more important than the prosecution of other crimes.
174. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Morganstem) 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, Morganstern v. United States, 105 S. Ct.
594 (1985); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1985).
175. 425 U.S. at 411-12. But see 425 U.S. at 429-30 (Brennan, J., concurring) (criticizing the
idea of "sufficiently testimonial").
176. 425 U.S. at 411-12. But cf Heidt, supra note 68 at 473-76. Heidt argues that the courts
have unevenly applied the act of production doctrine and that acts such as handwriting
exemplars and the custodian's act of production constitute admissions just as much as other
acts of production do. Heidt suggests that because of the difficulty in administering the act of
production doctrine, the only time the act should be sufficiently testimonial is when the
language of the subpoena discloses on its face that implied admissions will establish an element
of a crime. Id. at 481-85.
177. 425 U.S. at 432 (Marshall, J., concurring); cf United States v. Fishman, 726 F.2d 125,
127 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying the same rationale to compel production of patient medical
records of a doctor who was a sole practitioner, the court said that self-evident truths need not
be proven by the act of production).
178. Two Grand Jury Subpoenae indicated that the act of production was not incriminating.
769 F.2d at 57. This question differs from the emphasis in Fisher and Morganstern on whether
the act was testimonial. Morganstern, 771 F.2d at 148. In what may have provided the basis for
this confusion, the Fisher Court defined a testimonial act of production as one which adds to
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The Court in Fisher inadequately articulated the reasons why an
entity custodian's act of production is less testimonial than that of a
sole proprietor. Justice Marshall's statement that "the existence of
corporate record books is seldom in doubt" did not adequately
explain why there should be a distinction between a sole proprietor
and a custodian of entity records. Although federal securities statutes
and other laws require corporations to keep some financial records, 79
there is no reason why a court should presume the existence of other
documents, such as other financial records unique to that corporation
or particular receipts or contracts. Furthermore, Justice Marshall
failed to mention that an act of production may be testimonial by
authenticating and verifying the custodian's possession of the docu-
ments. Also, one may argue that because neither the majority in
Fisher nor Justice Marshall's concurrence stated that the custodian's
act of production is nontestimonial as a matter of law,'8 0 the Court
may have recognized that it was too early in the development of the
act of production doctrine to foreclose the possibility that a custo-
dian's act of production could be testimonial.
In 1983, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed
the issue whether a custodian's act of production is testimonial if it
verifies the custodian's possession of the documents in question. In In
re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated June 13, 1983 and June
22, 1983,81 the court found the act of production to be testimonial
the sum total of the government's information. 425 U.S. at 411. This definition relates to both
the incriminating and testimonial aspects of an act.
179. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(a), 13(c), 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a),
78m(c), 78o(d) (1982) (requiring registered corporations to file certain financial statements).
In Shapiro v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a person asked
to produce records could not invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination if
the records were required to be kept by law. 335 U.S. 1 (1948). In order for the "required
records" exception of Shapiro to apply:
the purpose of the [government's] inquiry must be essentially regulatory; second,
information is to be obtained by requiring the presentation of records of a kind
which the regulated party has customarily kept; and third, the records
themselves must have assumed "public aspects" which render them at least
analogous to public documents.
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968). Recently, in a case involving odometer
statements of car dealerships operating as sole proprietorships, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that Doe's "act of production" doctrine could not be invoked because the
odometer statements were "required records" within the meaning of Shapiro and Grosso. In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon Randall Underhill, No. 85-5127 (6th Cir.
Jan. 13, 1986) (available Feb. 1, 1986 on LEXIS, GenFed library, USApp file).
180. The majority opinion said that the production was not sufficiently testimonial. 425
U.S. at 411. Justice Marshall believed that the existence of corporate records was seldom in
doubt. 425 U.S. at 432 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also infra note 230 and accompanying
text.
181. 722 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1983).
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where a former officer possessed the corporation's records. Because
he was no longer a corporate officer, his production would prove that
he, and not the corporation, possessed the records. The court
implied, however, that a custodian's production of documents nor-
mally would only attest to the corporation's possession of the docu-
ments. I 2 Nevertheless, the case demonstrates another situation where
a corporate "custodian" meets the "testimonial and incriminating"
standard for invoking the act of production doctrine.1 1 3 Therefore, the
view that the custodian's act of production is not generally testimo-
nial does not foreclose the application of the act of production doc-
trine to corporate custodians and does not create a per se corporate
entity exception.
The court in Brown used a different test in applying the act of
production doctrine. The court noted that under Fisher the test for
determining whether the act of production doctrine applies is whether
the act verifies the existence, possession, or control of the papers.
Nevertheless, rather than applying this test,184 the Brown court
appeared to apply a test derived from Schmerber v. California.'"5
This test involves a determination of the communicative or noncom-
municative nature of the disclosures: whether the disclosure reveals a
person's thought processes." 6 This test is concerned with whether the
contents of the papers reveal a person's state of mind.18 7 The Brown
court therefore remanded to the district court solely for a determina-
tion of whether the act of production is incriminating.1 88  Because the
Brown court believed that under Fisher an act of production was com-
municative, it did not find a need to determine whether the "act of
182. Id. The court, although holding that the production by a former corporate officer
would be testimonial, stated the reason why a corporate representative usually is obligated to
produce records:
[T]here would rarely be any dispute over possession when the person subpoenaed
is required to respond in his representative capacity. In producing records ... he
would not be attesting to his personal possession of them but to their existence
and possession by the corporation which is not entitled to claim a fifth
amendment privilege with respect to them.
Id. at 986.
183. See also In re Katz, 623 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1980) (act of production was
incriminating and testimonial because the government, which sought to obtain articles of
incorporation, was not aware of the existence of or the target's relationship to the corporation).
184. According to Justices Marshall and White, this test allows limited application to the
corporation. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
185. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (compelled production of blood samples did not violate the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
186. 768 F.2d at 526.
187. See Note, supra note 66, at 686 (indicating that this approach may be based on the
desire to protect privacy, an approach which Fisher disapproved).
188. 768 F.2d at 529.
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production" was communicative."8 9 This interpretation of the act of
production doctrine implicitly contradicts the view that a corporate
custodian's act of production is not testimonial.
Judge Becker, in a concurring opinion in Brown, addressed the
issue of whether authentication of corporate records involves testimo-
nial communication. He found that production in the case before the
court would be testimonial, because the subpoena requested docu-
ments "relating to accounting services performed by [the defendant]
or under [his] supervision."1 90 Judge Becker believed that the sub-
poena constituted an interrogatory that asked the defendant whether
he had prepared the documents. 91 In this situation, according to
Judge Becker, the custodian of records, in complying with the sub-
poena, would testify to the existence of these records and their
authenticity. This testimonial communication would occur even if
Justice Marshall's observation, that the existence of the records is sel-
dom in doubt, was true.
Thus, Justice Marshall's attempt to create an entity exception to
the act of production doctrine appears to be without merit, because
Fisher made the privacy rationale for treating corporations differently
from sole proprietors no longer valid.192 The sole remaining rationale
for the entity exception seems to be that corporations should not be
able to shield their documents when courts and governmental bodies
need them for regulatory purposes. 19 3 The purpose of the next sec-
tions of this comment is to attempt to accomodate this government
need for regulation with the application of the act of production doc-
trine to entity custodians.
VI. THREE RECENT CASES: A FOUNDATION FOR A RULE
A. A Common Theme
The three recent cases from the Second, Third, and Sixth Cir-
cuits194 provide a foundation for formulating a rule on how courts
should apply the act of production doctrine to the custodians of col-
lective entities. Despite their differences, the three cases share a com-
189. The court said, "[i]n Fisher the Court specifically referred to the communicative nature
of production." 768 F.2d at 527. The court then indicated that the critical determination in
Fisher and Doe was whether the act of production would be incriminating. Id. at 528.
190. Id. at 531 (Becker, J., concurring).
191. Id.
192. See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
193. Even if Doe undermined the rationales for the collective entity exception, a corporation
still has no fifth amendment privilege in its documents. Doe explicitly held that the contents of
business documents are not privileged. 465 U.S. at 612.
194. See supra notes 85-135 and accompanying text.
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mon theme: (1) a custodian of corporate records need not incriminate
himself with the testimonial acts of production; and (2) the act of
production doctrine must not prevent a grand jury or governmental
body from ordering corporate records to be produced. The differ-
ences in the cases arose out of the manner in which each court fur-
thered the goals it articulated.
The courts articulated the second concern, that a corporation or
its agents must not be permitted to shield corporate records, in vari-
ous ways. In Morganstern, the Sixth Circuit held that the custodian
had to produce the corporate records. 195 In Two Grand Jury Sub-
poenae, the Second Circuit noted that the corporation had a duty to
produce records and explained that, when the act of production
would incriminate the custodian of records, an appointed agent could
produce the records without breaching the corporation's duty. 196 In
Brown, the Third Circuit intimated that the government could request
the court to direct the corporation to appoint an agent to produce and
authenticate the documents; the court wrote that "[tihe government
did not in this case request the court to direct that the corporation
appoint such an agent."'197 The Brown court also stated that the gov-
ernment could insure that the custodian produced and authenticated
the documents by granting him statutory use immunity. Thus, each
court provided a means whereby the government could insure that the
documents are produced without forcing the custodian of the docu-
ments to testify against himself.
The three courts based the concern over government access to
corporate documents on the view that the corporate entity exception
is valid at least as applied to the entity. The court in Brown stated
that neither corporations nor other collective entities may assert a
privilege against self-incrimination."' 198  The courts in Two Grand
Jury Subpoenae and in Morganstern denied the fifth amendment privi-
lege to corporate representatives because:
recognition of the individual's claim of privilege with respect to the
195. 771 F.2d at 144.
196. 769 F.2d at 57. A relevant factor in a court's decision as to whether documents must
be produced is the party to whom the subpoena is addressed. The court, in Two Grand Jury
Subpoenae, considered that the subpoenas were addressed to "custodian" and "Custodian of
Records" when it determined that the corporation had a duty to produce the documents. Id. at
59. The court distinguished In re Katz, 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1980) and In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated June 13, 1983 and June 22, 1983, 722 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1983).
Both of these cases had applied the act of production doctrine to the corporation (thereby
shielding the records) by emphasizing that the the subpoenas were not directed to the
corporation. See also note 214.
197. Brown, 768 F.2d at 529 n.4.
198. Id. at 528.
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financial records of the organization would substantially under-
mine the unchallenged rule that the organization itself is not enti-
tled to claim any Fifth Amendment privilege, and largely frustrate
legitimate governmental regulation of such organizations. 9 9
The first aspect of the common theme running throughout these
cases is the belief that an individual employee should not incriminate
himself through his testimonial acts of production. This belief may
not be apparent in Morganstern and Two Grand Jury Subpoenae
because each court ordered the employee to produce the documents in
question.2°° Although the two courts expressly limited Doe's holding
to sole proprietors, each court, in some way, expressed a concern that
individuals may incriminate themselves by the act of producing docu-
ments. In Two Grand Jury Subpoenae, the court implied that the
employee may assert a right not to produce corporate documents
when the act of producing the records is testimonial and incriminat-
ing.2°  Although stating that these situations, if any, would be rare,
the court did not disapprove of the application of the act of produc-
tion doctrine in two cases involving corporations: In re Katz2"2 and In
re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated June 13, 1983 and June
22, 1983. 203 The court in Katz applied the act of production doctrine
where (1) the subpoenaed articles of incorporation indicated the per-
son's connections with the corporation, and (2) the government did
not know the identity of the corporation. 2°4 The doctrine also was
applied in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, where a subpoena was
directed to a former corporate officer. Because he was a former
officer, his production of corporate documents would verify his pos-
session, rather than the corporation's possession, of the documents.2 °5
The statement in Two Grand Jury Subpoenae that Doe applied
solely to sole proprietors, 20 6 seems to indicate that a corporate custo-
dian may not assert a fifth amendment privilege by invoking the act of
production doctrine. Instead, these statements indicate the court's
concern that an entity should not invoke the fifth amendment in order
199. Two Grand Jury Subpoenae, 769 F.2d at 56; Morganstern, 771 F.2d at 145 (quoting
Bellis, 417 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1974)).
200. Morganstern, 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985);
Two Grand Jury Subpoena, 769 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1985).
201. 769 F.2d at 57.
202. 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1980).
203. 722 F.2d 981. The court in Two Grand Jury Subpoenae noted the application of the act
of production doctrine in this case and in Katz. 769 F.2d at 59.
204. Katz, 623 F.2d at 126.
205. 722 F.2d at 986-87. The court held that the district court erred in deciding that the
Fisher act of production doctrine did not apply to corporate records. Id. at 986.
206. 769 F.2d at 58.
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to shield records. The court in Two Grand Jury Subpoenae stated that
Doe did not change present law which "gives the custodian ... no
fifth amendment privilege to stop the corporation from producing docu-
ments."2 7 Therefore, Two Grand Jury Subpoenae does not necessar-
ily hold that a corporate custodian may not claim a fifth amendment
privilege; he may claim a privilege if he meets the act of production
criteria as long as the documents are not shielded.
The concern that a custodian's act of production not be used
against him is voiced in the other two cases, Morganstern and Brown.
Even though the court in Morganstern held that a corporate represen-
tative had to comply with a subpoena duces tecum,2 °8 it mentioned, in
dicta, that if the act of production would be used against the custo-
dian, "evidence of that fact is subject to a motion to suppress. "209 The
same problem was the major concern in Brown, where the court
allowed the custodian to avoid production if the act of production
would be incriminating.2"' All three circuits, therefore, provide a
means to prevent the act of production from incriminating the person
producing collective entity documents.
B. An Application of Doe to the Corporate Setting
Although Morganstern and Two Grand Jury Subpoenae explicitly
held that Doe does not apply to corporations,2 ' the common theme
running through these cases may provide a basis for applying the act
of production doctrine to collective entities. 212 The Doe Court was
not only concerned that the producer of business documents not
incriminate himself by the testimonial aspects of production, but the
Court also believed that corporations should not be able to shield
their records from investigative governmental bodies. Doe held that
the contents of business records are not privileged.2"3 If no privilege
exists in the documents themselves, then a grand jury or a govern-
207. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
Unlike a sole proprietor's assertion of the fifth amendment in Doe, the application of the
act of production doctrine to a corporate custodian would not prevent production of the
papers where the subpoena was addressed to "custodian" or to "corporation." See supra note
196 and accompanying text. Because the corporation is an entity separate from the person
producing the records, the court may direct the corporation to find a party, who would not be
incriminated by the production, to produce the corporate documents.
208. 771 F.2d at 144. The court's holding was predicated on the idea that the act of
production would not be testimonial, because the custodian acts only in a representative
capacity. Id. at 148.
209. Id.
210. 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985).
211. 771 F.2d at 147; 769 F.2d at 58.
212. See supra notes 197-211 and accompanying text.
213. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
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mental body may subpoena them. Any act of production privilege
claimed by an individual producer should not be translated into a
privilege as to the contents of the documents requested to be pro-
duced.214 Thus, if interpreted in this manner, Brown, Two Grand Jury
Subpoenae, and Morganstern can be seen as applications of Doe to
collective entities.
C. Common Theme as a Foundation for a Rule
The goals implicit in the theme of the three cases provide a basis
for allowing individuals in collective entities to claim a fifth amend-
ment privilege when producing corporate documents. The first goal,
allowing an individual to avoid incriminating himself by his personal,
testimonial act is a fundamental fifth amendment right.215 To hold
that a person waives his right against self-incrimination because of his
employment would pay too much homage to a "corporate entity
exception" no longer based on principle.216
The second goal, denying a corporation the right to shield its
documents, also is reasonable, as long as courts are able to achieve
this goal without encroaching on individual rights. The remaining
rationale for the entity exception is that it enables the government to
regulate corporations and other collective entities. 217 If courts fashion
means to acquire the documents without requiring the custodian's
incriminating act of production, then they can still further this regula-
tory goal. Courts may apply the act of production doctrine without
sacrificing the rationale for the corporate entity exception, because the
contents of entity documents are not privileged.
The courts in Brown, Two Grand Jury Subpoenae, and Morgan-
stern have not fully articulated the means (agent appointment, use
immunity, and suppression) by which they attempt to acquire docu-
ments without the custodian's production. For example, the Third
Circuit in Brown, which provided for the appointment of an agent
when a custodian successfully asserts his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, has left some questions unanswered. If the corporation is
214. When a sole proprietor successfully invokes the act of production doctrine, the
government is not able to acquire the documents unless it grants the proprietor use immunity.
Doe, 465 U.S. at 617. This may result in the shielding of the proprietor's documents. In
contrast, a court may enforce a subpoena directed toward a corporation after a party invokes
the doctrine by ordering the corporation to produce the documents through an agent. The
status of the corporation, as an entity distinct from the party invoking the privilege against
self-incrimination, allows the government access to the documents.
215. Id. at 612-13.
216. But see supra notes 161-93 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
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ordered to appoint an agent to produce the documents, may it avoid
the order if the original custodian is the sole party who knows the
existence or the location of the records or if the records are physically
in the custodian's possession? These problems are accentuated in
investigations of one-person corporations. In dicta, the Second Cir-
cuit, in Two Grand Jury Subpoenae, indicated that a "one-person cor-
poration" 218 may be required to hire a party to produce and then
testify about the subpoenaed records. 219  This suggestion, however,
fails to solve situations where only the custodian is able to find the
documents or testify about them. If the court orders the custodian to
assist the special agent, the custodian is indirectly acting in a testimo-
nial, incriminating manner, because the agent's testimony about the
documents will be based on the information that he communicated to
the agent. In Brown, the Third Circuit did not indicate that a corpo-
ration must hire a new employee, nor did it explain how a one-man
corporation could comply with a subpoena. 220 Thus, it is possible that
the Third Circuit may allow a one-man corporation to shield its
records, because the party invoking the privilege is the only party able
to comply with the subpoena.
The Sixth Circuit's suggestion in Morganstern, that testimonial
aspects of production be suppressed after the court orders produc-
tion,221 seems questionable in light of Doe. The Supreme Court in Doe
ruled on a court's ability to order an act of production when the act
may be testimonial and incriminating and declined to extend the juris-
diction of courts to include prospective grants of use immunity in the
absence of the formal request that the immunity statute requires.222
218. The target in Two Grand Jury Subpoenae was a majority stockholder. The court
referred to him as a one-man corporation because he was the sole operating officer and director
of the corporation. 769 F.2d at 54.
219. Id. at 57.
220. The court stated that "most business entities will have agents who can provide
testimony without self-incrimination." 768 F.2d at 529. Presumably, the court would not grant
the government's request for an order requiring a one-man corporation to appoint an agent
because no other party would be able to produce the documents. On the other hand, the court
indicated that the government had not requested an agent, implying that if it had, the one-man
corporation would have been required to appoint an agent.
221. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
222. Doe, 465 U.S. at 616. The Court explained that courts suppress compelled,
incriminating testimony that results from a violation of a witnesses' fifth amendment rights but
distinguished this situation from constructive use immunity, where a court compels a witness
to testify. Courts that have suppressed testimony have not compelled it. The purpose of
suppression is to deter the government from committing future violations of witnesses' fifth
amendment rights, but this goal is not met through constructive use immunity. Id. at 616 n. 16.
In other words, courts may suppress testimonial communication but should not compel such
testimony without the statutory grant of authority. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Martinez), 626 F.2d 1051, 1057 (1st Cir. 1980) (stating that judicial creation of an
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The Court explained that Congress expressly left this decision exclu-
sively to the Justice Department.2 23 By allowing a trial court to sup-
press testimonial acts of production which have been compelled, the
Morganstern court seemed to circumvent the mandate of Doe.
Statutory use immunity is appropriate for the application of the
act of production doctrine in the corporate context. The rationale for
the entity exception is preventing corporations or other entities from
shielding their documents.224 The common theme of the cases from
the three circuits is that courts must not compel individuals to incrim-
inate themselves but must prevent corporations from shielding docu-
ments.225 The immunity statutes 226 are suitable vehicles for courts to
further these competing goals. In Kastigar v. United States, 227 the
Supreme Court of the United States held that immunity granted
under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 need only be coextensive with the scope of the
party's privilege. Because the government need only immunize that
portion of the requested evidence for which a valid claim of immunity
has been raised,228 the statute allows prosecutors to obtain the docu-
ments while allowing the person producing them to assert the privi-
lege against self-incrimination.
VII. THE FRAMEWORK FOR A RULE
Given the rationale for the entity exception and the common
theme of the three cases, it is possible to develop a framework in
which the act of production doctrine could apply in the corporate
context. Courts could examine the application of the doctrine by
using the following steps. The first question a court should ask is
whether the act of production is testimonial. Because the act of pro-
duction is sometimes testimonial,229 one cannot argue that a corporate
custodian's act of production is non-testimonial as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court in Fisher explained that this question does not
lend itself to categorical answers but, instead, depends on the facts
and circumstances of particular cases.230 Courts, however, should
exclusionary rule in this context would amount to a judicial grant of immunity without
statutory authorization).
223. 465 U.S. at 616.
224. See supra notes 171-73, 193 and accompanying text (discussing the pragmatic,
regulatory rationale for the entity exception).
225. See supra notes 193-210 and accompanying text (specifying the ways in which the
cases agree).
226. See supra note 79 for the text of the statute.
227. 406 U.S. 441, 450 (1972); Martinez, 626 F.2d at 1058.
228. Martinez, 626 F.2d at 1058.
229. See supra notes 179-83, 188-91 and accompanying text.
230. 425 U.S. at 410.
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note that the custodian's act of production may not be sufficiently
testimonial if the existence of the documents is a foregone conclusion
and if the act verifies only the entity's possession of the documents.231
If the act is testimonial, the next step involves an attempt to pre-
vent corporations from shielding their documents. When a subpoena
is directed to a corporation, and the act of production would be testi-
monial and incriminating for an individual custodian, the court may
direct the corporation to comply with the subpoena by appointing an
agent to produce the documents.2 32 Because the corporation may not
be able to comply with the court's order,233 the court should give it an
opportunity to show why it cannot do so. If the corporation makes
this showing, prosecutors must then resort to statutory use immunity
in order to gain access to the documents. Courts should not order a
custodian to produce documents if the custodian meets the require-
ments of the act of production doctrine, unless the prosecutor makes a
request for statutory use immunity.234 If testimonial aspects of pro-
duction are admitted into evidence without court compulsion, the
courts should be permitted to suppress this evidence.235
VIII. CONCLUSION
Doe's rationale limited the collective entity exception but did not
change the rule that a corporation has no fifth amendment privilege
with regard to the contents of its documents. The act of production
doctrine should apply to the individual custodians of corporate
records, because there is no reason for creating a per se denial of this
doctrine to the custodian. The act of production doctrine relates
more to the custodian's long-held privilege as to testimony than to the
contents-based collective entity exception. A denial of the privilege to
a custodian simply because he acts in a "representative capacity" for
the corporation or entity would impinge upon fundamental constitu-
tional rights and would be based on meaningless legal jargon and dis-
torted legal reasoning. The collective entity exception, insofar as it
relates to custodians of records, has reached the end of a useful life.
231. See supra notes 177-79, 182 and accompanying text.
232. This method of acquiring the documents highlights a major difference between a
corporate custodian and a sole proprietor. When a sole proprietor invokes the act of
production doctrine, there is no separate entity which may be ordered to comply with the
subpoena.
233. See supra notes 218-20 (specifying problems that arise when the person asserting the
privilege is the only party who is able to produce the documents).
234. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text (explaining that courts have no
jurisdiction to grant constructive use immunity).
235. See supra notes 222 (Suppression of evidence derived from violations of fifth
amendment is permitted.).
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Now that the contents of business records are no longer protected by
the fifth amendment, the entity exception should be replaced with an
interpretation of Doe that denies a corporation the opportunity to
shield its documents while at the same time allowing the custodian to
claim a fifth amendment privilege when production would be testimo-
nial and incriminating.
The common theme of the three post-Doe cases analyzed in this
comment provides a framework by which a custodian's "act of pro-
duction" privilege can be formulated.236 A custodian should have the
right to avoid self-incriminating and testimonial acts of production,
especially if the documents sought can be obtained by other means. If
the government's quest for information is not impeded, the custo-
dian's fifth amendment rights should not be sacrificed.
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, has indicated
in dicta that acts of production would rarely be incriminating and
testimonial.23 Although this may be true, the Court should not hesi-
tate to allow custodians of corporate records to claim a fifth amend-
ment privilege when the act of producing the documents would be
testimonial. By doing so, the Court would heed Justice Bradley's
admonition in Boyd that illegitimate and unconstitutional practices
"can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional pro-
visions for the security of person and property should be liberally con-
strued. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their
efficacy and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted
more in sound than in substance." '238 By allowing corporate custodi-
ans to invoke the act of production doctrine, the Supreme Court can
keep alight Boyd's flickering flame.
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236. See supra notes 195-210 and accompanying text (explaining the common theme of
Brown, Two Grand Jury Subpoenae, and Morganstern).
237. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text (expanding on the notion that a
custodian's act of production is not sufficiently testimonial).
238. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
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